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The literature on indirect tax reforms in pollution-ridden economies is quite limited. This 
paper, using a model of a small open economy with production and consumption generated 
pollution, considers the welfare implications of tax reforms within an integrated structure of 
consumption and production taxes. Specifically, both in the presence and absence of a binding 
government revenue constraint, we derive sufficient conditions for welfare improvement in 
the case where we implement (i)  reforms in either production or consumption taxes, (ii) 
reforms in both consumption and production taxes and (iii) uniform changes in consumption 
taxes. 
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Integrated Reforms of Indirect Taxes in the Presence of Pollution 
 
1. Introduction 
During the past couple of decades there has been a general consensus regarding 
the reforms of national tax systems. International institutions, e.g., the WTO, the IMF 
and the World Bank, encourage governments to reform their indirect tax structure. 
Many types of reforms have been suggested. For example, the countries are urged 
to reduce their reliance on discriminatory trade taxes as tariffs,
1 and switching to taxes 
such as income taxes, consumption taxes and VATs for the purpose of raising 
government revenues. Another suggested reform is to simplify the tax structure by 
bringing in more uniformity in it. Motivated by such developments in the policy 
arena, the academic literature identifies sufficient conditions under which proposed 
indirect tax reforms, e.g., reduction in trade taxes and increase in consumption taxes, 
or moving taxes towards uniformity, improve welfare and does not reduce 
government tax revenue. This latter concern becomes even more important for 
revenue strained developing economies. Achieving these two goals, countries are able 
to attain a so-called “double-dividend”. That is, a tax system which improves welfare 
and does not reduce tax revenues.  
By now, a sizeable literature has addressed the aforementioned issues. In 
particular, within the context of open economies, two popular types of trade and/or 
domestic tax reforms have been examined. First, a policy of revenue-neutral reforms 
in trade taxes and/or in commodity taxes has been examined.
 2 Within this strand of 
the literature, studies such as Michael et al. (1993) identify sufficient conditions under 
which welfare improves when (i) tariffs decrease and consumption taxes increase 
while maintaining government revenue constant, and (ii) the total tax burden rate on 
goods moves towards uniformity, through adjustments either in consumption taxes or 
in tariffs, with or without a binding government revenue constraint.
3 Abe (1995) 
identifies welfare improving sufficient conditions of a coordinated tariff and 
commodity tax reform in a small open economy with endogenous provision of public 
                                                 
1 According to the World Bank (2002), during the 1990s in low- and medium-income countries, the 
share of domestic indirect taxes (i.e., taxes on goods and services) in total current government revenue 
rose from 26 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 1999. During the same period the share of trade taxes fell 
from 17 percent to 9 percent. 
2 Earlier literature on trade and domestic tax/subsidy reform policies, without a binding government 
revenue constraint include, among others, Hatta (1977a, 1977b), Diewert et al. (1989). 
3 Other studies within this strand include works such as, Anderson (1999), Lahiri and Nasimi (2005).    2
goods. A second strand in the literature analyses a reform of trade taxes accompanied 
by appropriate changes in domestic taxes so that consumer or producer prices do not 
change. For example, Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) demonstrate that welfare improves 
and government tax revenue increases when a uniform reduction in trade taxes is 
accompanied by appropriate increases in consumption taxes so that consumer prices 
remain constant. Keen and Ligthat (2002) generalize the Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) 
result by demonstrating that welfare improves and government tax revenue increases 
with any tariff reduction that increases the value of domestic production at world 
prices, and is accompanied by a consumption tax reform which leaves consumer 
prices constant. Lahiri and Nasim (2005) examine the potential of revenue-neutral 
reforms of tariffs and sales taxes on final goods and intermediate inputs in Pakistan. 
They conclude that there is scope in reducing tariffs on final goods, but not on 
intermediate inputs. Emran (2005) considers selected reform strategies in a model of a 
small open economy with export taxes and taxes on production and consumption. 
Emran and Stiglitz (2005) conclude that the popular consensus requiring LDCs to 
reduce trade taxes and increase consumption (VAT) taxes in order to raise 
government revenue can be ineffective due to the existence of a sizable informal 
sector in these economies.
 4  Boadway and Sato (2007) extend the Emran-Stiglitz 
(2005) model by considering an economy with a formal and an informal sector, both 
producing only tradable, though different, outputs, whose production uses importable 
and exportable intermediate inputs. They investigate conditions under which one tax 
regime, e.g., a full VAT regime, is favored over the other, i.e., a full trade tax regime, 
as a way on increasing welfare and government tax revenues.
5  
In the process of economic growth, one issue that worries policy makers is the 
impact of this expanded economic activity on the quality of environment. To this end, 
although by now there is a sizeable theoretical literature examining the links between 
economic expansion and environmental quality, there is only a limited number of 
studies which address the welfare and revenue implications of tax policy reforms in 
the context of pollution-ridden economies. Specifically, abstracting from government 
                                                 
4 All the above studies examine the welfare and revenue implications of indirect tax reforms in the 
context of a static general equilibrium model of a small open economy. Yet, such tax reforms may also 
entail dynamic policy aspects, such as the growth rate of output (income). For such considerations see, 
among others, Naito (2005) and (2006). 
5 As noted by the authors, if profits were fully taxed, then the VAT regime would be preferred to that 
of trade taxes. Emran-Stiglitz (2005) cynicism about the reforms has also been criticised by Keen 
(2006).     3
revenue considerations of tax policy reforms, Copeland (1994) identifies sufficient 
conditions for welfare-improving trade and environmental policy reforms in the 
context of a polluted small open economy. Beghin and Dessus (1999) examine the 
implications of reforms in trade and environmental policies on welfare and the level 
of pollution emissions under a government tax revenue constraint. Turunen-Red and 
Woodland (2004) examine selected Pareto-improving multilateral reforms of trade 
and production taxes in the context of a many countries and goods general 
equilibrium competitive model. Finally, Hatzipanayotou et al. (2005) examine the 
welfare implications of a number of multilateral environmental policy (pollution 
taxes) reforms in a two-country model of production generated cross-border pollution 
and of simultaneous provision of private and public sectors pollution abatement. 
6    
To the best of our knowledge only a limited number of studies has, thus far, 
related the issue of tax policy reforms to consumption generated pollution.
7 Beghin et 
al. (1997), abstracting from tax revenue considerations, examine the welfare 
implications of environmental, production, consumption, and trade tax policy reforms. 
Kayalica and Kayalica (2005) in a reciprocal dumping model with consumption 
generated pollution demonstrate, among other things, that a revenue neutral reform of 
increasing consumption taxes and reducing tariffs is strictly Pareto improving.  
This paper considers a small open economy where pollution is generated 
either by production or by consumption. The government raises revenue and control 
pollution by imposing consumption and/or production taxes. Thus, we consider a 
more general model than what has been analyzed in the literature, and focus on two 
different types of indirect taxes rather than indirect tax and trade taxes. We also 
consider a situation when government revenue constraint is not binding as well as a 
situation when it is binding. Under these different scenarios, we derive sufficient 
conditions for welfare improvement in the case of specific types of reforms, viz., (i) 
increasing production (consumption) taxes and decreasing consumption (production) 
taxes, and (ii) reforms in production and consumption taxes.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Naito (2005) examines in a dynamic context of a pollution ridden small open economy the welfare 
and growth implications of revenue-neutral tariff reforms. 
7 Another strand of the literature, not however relevant for the present paper, examine economic 
implications of consumption generated pollution, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (1995), Perrings and 
Ansuategi (2000).   4
2. The General Model 
We consider a small open, perfectly competitive economy which produces and 
consumes 1 K + internationally traded goods. There are K  types of pollutants 
associated with the production or consumption of these goods. Good (0) is the 
numeraire good whose production does not generate any pollution. The country is 
endowed with the inelastic supply of M primary factors, denoted by the vectorv .  
Pollution is modeled as a by-product of both production and consumption. The 
production or consumption of each commodity generates a different type of pollutant. 
Let  j z  and j r  ( 1,2,..., j K = ), denote respectively the level of pollution generated 
from the production and consumption of a unit of the 
th j  good. The levels of 
pollution  j z  and  j r  are soon explicitly defined. Production or consumption generated 
pollution adversely affects households’ utility. Consumption and production taxes are 
levied by the government to discourage respectively pollution-generating 
consumption by the country’s households and pollution-generating production by the 
producers. All tax revenues are lump-sum distributed to domestic households.    
The country is a price taker in world commodity markets.
8 The international 
prices of all goods are assumed to equal unity, and are denoted by the price 
vector
* (1,1,.....,1) p
′ = , a(1 ) K × vector of unit-scalars.
9 Thus, for the 
th j  commodity  
1 jj p τ =+ is the domestic consumer price, and  1 jj qt = − be the domestic producer 
price, where  j τ and  j t denote respectively the specific consumption and production 
tax levied on the 
th j commodity. No taxes of any type are levied on the numeraire 
good(0), i.e., 
*
00 qp = .  
The economy’s production side is represented by the revenue 
function (1, , ) R qv which captures the economy’s maximum revenue from production 
of the internationally traded goods with vector of factors [] v and vectors of producer 
prices  [ ] 1, q . For the rest of the analysis, since the vector of factor endowments 
v remains unchanged, the revenue function is denoted by ( ) R q . The  ( ) R q function is 
                                                 
8 We follow a standard practice of the literature of indirect tax reforms, which, by and large, for 
analytical convenience confines the analysis of such tax reforms in the context of small open 
economies, i.e., terms of trade considerations, are unaccounted for.    
9 A prime () ′ denotes a transposed vector or matrix.   5
assumed convex and homogeneous of degree one in producer prices. By the envelop 
theorem  (/ )
j qj R Rq =∂ ∂ is the supply function of the 
th j good. Production generated 
pollution is ()
j jj q zR q α = , implying that the production of each good generates a 
different type of pollutant, and where 0 j α > , is a scalar and denotes the units of 
pollution generated by the production of a unit of the 
th j good.  
Turning to the demand side of this economy, it comprises of identical 
households who consume the  1 K +  commodities, and whose utility is adversely 
affected by production and consumption generated pollution. A representative 
household’s preferences are captured by the expenditure function  (1, , , , ) Ep z r u  
denoting the minimum expenditure on private goods achieving a certain level of 
utility() u , at consumer price vector  p and vector of production and consumption 
pollutants z an d r. We define the level of pollution generated by the consumption of a 
unit of the 
th j good as (1, , , , )
j jj p rE p z r u β = , where  0 j β >  is a scalar. This 
specification again implies that the consumption of each good generates a different 
type of pollutant.  The  (1, , , , ) Ep z r u function is increasing in u , in level of pollution 
z or  r , and non-decreasing and concave in p.
10  The derivative  /
j pj EE p =∂ ∂ is the 
compensated demand for good( ) j , and pp E is a ( ) KK × negative semi-definite 
matrix.
11 The derivative  u E  captures the inverse of the marginal utility of income, and 
the derivative 
j z E  or 
i r E is respectively, the marginal damage caused by the 
pollutant j z or  i r , and thus it represents the household’s marginal willingness to pay 
for its reduction (e.g., see Copeland, 1994).  
The government’s tax revenue,( ) T , which is distributed to households in a 
lump-sum fashion,  equals the sum of consumption and production tax revenues. That 
is,  
 
                                                 
10 The  (.) E function is increasing in z or in r since an increase in any type of pollutant is assumed to 
harm the households’ utility. Therefore, to attain a given level of utility, u , private spending on 
consumption must rise.  
11 The compensated demand and supply functions for the numeraire good are respectively, 
0 p E and
0 q R .   6
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(,,,) () (,,,) ()
jj
KK
pq j p j q
jj
TE p z r u t R q E p z r u t R q ττ
==
′′ =+ = + ∑∑ ,                     (1) 
 
where  p E  and  q R , respectively, are the vectors of compensated demand and the 
output supply functions. Recall that for the numeraire good(0),  00 0 t τ == . The 
country’s income-expenditure identity requires that private spending on goods must 
equal income from production plus income from government taxes. Thus, the 
country’s budget constraint is given as follows:   
   
 (,,,) () (,,,) () pq Epzru Rq E pzru t Rq τ′′ =+ + .                                                (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are the main equations of the model. They are used to 
examine the welfare implications of reforms in production and consumption taxes 
under two scenarios. First, we consider the case where there is no government 
revenue constraint. Second, we consider the case of a binding government revenue 
constraint by including an additional condition that dT=0.  
We conclude this section by deriving the effects of the taxes on welfare and 
revenue levels. Differentiating equation (2), we obtain: 
() () rp z q du E dE E t dR βτ α ′′ =− − − −                                                             (3)  
                                          
where  
pp p p r p z p u dE E d E dr E dz E du τ =+ + +,    and                                                  (4) 
  qq q dR R dt =− .                                                                                                  (5)  
 For the rest of the analysis, we assume, for simplicity, that private goods and clean 
environment are independent in consumption, i.e., 0 pr pz EE = = .
12  
Equation (3) can be rewritten so as to capture the welfare effect of changes in 
a single consumption tax, say that on the 
th i  good, and of changes in a single 
production tax, say on the 
th n good. That is:
 13 
                                                 
12 The assumption that the demand for private goods is independent of the environmental quality is 
often made in the literature (i.e., Bovenberg 1999, Beghin and Dessus 1999). For example, this would 
be the case if the utility function is quasi-linear, e.g.,  (,) () ucz uc z λ = + , where λ is a constant 
parameter. Clearly, in this case goods and clean environment are independent in consumption.   
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Ω= + − ∑ , and is normally assumed to be positive.
14 It 
represents the general equilibrium inverse of the marginal utility of income; inclusive 
of feedback via consumption taxes and consumption generated pollution. Equation (6) 
can be further elaborated on by using the properties of the expenditure and revenue 
functions that compensated demands and output supplies are homogeneous of degree 
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Note that 1 kk p τ =+ ,1 kk qt =− ,, , kj i n = , and by the reciprocity conditions 
kj j k pp pp EE = and 
kj j k qq qq R R = . Using the above properties and after some 





ij i n j n
K
ip p i j jp p i nq q j n jq q n
ji jn
du E p E d s R s s q R dt σσ στ
≠≠
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
=+ − + − + − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑∑ .     (7)                               
 
We shall call the ratio ( )/ 0( 0)
k kk r k k Ep σ βτ = −> <  the rate of under-taxation 
of consumption-pollution when 0 k σ > , and the rate of over-taxation of consumption-
pollution when 0 k σ < .  That is, if the marginal willingness to pay for the pollution 
reduction for the 
th k  good is greater than its pollution tax, then this good is under-
                                                                                                                                            





jr j p jz j q
jj
du E dE E t dR βτ α
==
=− − − − ∑∑ . Simple algebra, 
using the relevant equations (4) and (5), and assuming that 0
jj j j pr pz EE = = , result in equation (6).  
14 Subscripts on the functions, i.e.,  ,,,
ji jj j j j pp pz pr pu EEEE  and 
jn qq R  denote partial derivatives. For 
example,  /
ji j pp p i EE p =∂ ∂ ,  /
jn j qq q n R Rq =∂ ∂ . It is to be noted that 0( 0)
ji pp E ><  if the 
th j  
and  
th i  goods are substitutes (complements) in consumption,  ,,
j pu Ej K ∀ ∈  is positive assuming that 
all good are normal in consumption, and  0( 0)
jn qq R < >  if the 
th j  and 
th n goods are substitutes 
(complements) in production.  
   8
taxed and vise versa.
15 Similarly, the ratio ( )/ , ,
k kk z k k sE t q k j n α = −= , is positive 
(negative) depending on whether the 
th k production generated pollutant is under 
(over-) taxed.  For the purposes of our analysis, we call  0 k s >  the rate of under-
taxation of production-pollution, and  0 k s <  the rate of over-taxation of production-
pollution. Since it is assumed that the numeraire good, is non-polluting and untaxed, 
0 00 0 0 () / 0 r Ep σ βτ =− =  and ( ) 00 0 0 0 /0 z sE t q α =−= . 
When government revenue constraint is binding ( 0 dT = ), differentiating 
equation (2), using equations (4), (5), and the homogeneity properties of the 
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=∑  and it is positive assuming that goods are normal in 
consumption; 
0 00 (/ )
ii ip p p p EE η =  is the compensated demand elasticity of the 
th i  
good with respect to the consumer price of the numeraire, 
0 00 (/ )
jj nq q q qRR ε =  is the 
elasticity of supply of the 
th j  good with respect to the producer price of the 
numeraire.
16 
Equations (3) and (7) are relevant for examining the welfare implications of 
the indirect tax reforms assuming a non-binding government revenue constraint. The 
system of equations (3), (7) and (8) are used to examine the welfare implications of 
                                                 
15 Note that 
11 (/) (/ )
kk kr k k k k p p Ep E r r E β
−− =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂is the amount by which consumers need to be 
compensated in order to keep utility constant due pollution generated by a Euro’s (dollar’s) worth 
increase in consumption of the 
th k  good.  / kk p τ is the ad-valorem equivalent of the specific 
consumption tax  k τ on the  
th k  good.   
16 The term  0 (1 (1 )) ii p i E τ η +−  emerges following straightforward algebra of 
0 ()
ii ip ip p pE E τ − . 
Likewise manipulating the term 
0 ()
nn nq nq q qR tR + results in 
0 (1 (1 ))
n nn q tR ε −− 0 [1 (1 )]
n nn q tR ε = −−    9
indirect tax reforms under a binding government revenue constraint and in the 
presence of both consumption-generated and production-generated pollution.  
 
3. Absence of Government Revenue Constraints 
In this section, we assume away the existence of any government revenue 
constraints and examine the welfare implications of reforms in consumption taxes and 
in production taxes.  We consider these one at a time, but in the presence of both 
types of pollution and both types of taxes.   
 
3.1 Reforms in consumption taxes 
In this subsection, we examine the welfare implications of  increasing 
(decreasing) the consumption tax on the good which exhibits the highest rate of 
consumption-pollution under-taxation (over-taxation),  i.e., we shall increase 
(decrease) the consumption tax rate for 
th i good if  ( ) 0( 0), ij j σ σ − >< ∀ , to the point 
where  i σ falls (rises) towards the level of the second highest (lowest) σ . In this 
exercise we do not consider changes in production taxes whose non-zero levels are 
held constant. With this in mind, whether there exist production generated pollution 
and/or production taxes does not affect the results to follow. Since production taxes 




jj i i j i
KK
jr j p p i ip p i j jp p i
jj i
du E E d E p E d β ττ σ σ σ τ
=≠
⎡ ⎤
=− − = + − ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∑∑ .          (9)           
 
The following proposition which is derived directly from equation (9), states 
sufficient conditions for welfare improving consumption tax reforms required for 
moving the rates of under-taxation or over-taxation of consumption-pollution towards 
uniformity.  
 
Proposition 1: Assume the existence of consumption and production generated 
pollution, and that some goods are under-taxed while some other are over-taxed.  
•  Suppose that the 
th i good exhibits the highest rate of under-taxation of 
consumption-pollution, i.e., 0 i σ >  and() 0 , ij jK σ σ − >∀ ∈. Then, increasing 
the consumption tax on this good, so that its rate of under-taxation of 
consumption-pollution does not fall below the level of the second highest   10
under-taxation rate, improves social welfare if the 
th i  good is a substitute in 
consumption with all other goods.  
•  Suppose that the 
th i good exhibits the highest rate of over-taxation of 
consumption-pollution, i.e., 0 i σ <  and() 0 , ij jK σ σ − <∀ ∈. Then decreasing 
the consumption tax on this good, so that its rate of over-taxation of 
consumption-pollution does not fall below the level of  the second highest rate 
of over-taxation, improves welfare if, in consumption, the 
th i good is a 
substitute to all other goods. 
 
Intuitively, the above results can be interpreted as follows. Take the case 
whereby the 
th i  good exhibits the highest rate of consumption-pollution under-
taxation, thus it is the good associated with the most distorted consumption-pollution. 
Then, increasing the consumption tax on this good so that its rate of under-taxation of 
consumption-pollution does not fall below the level of the second highest rate, aims at 
bringing the consumption generated pollution distortions towards uniformity. This 
result depends on the relationship in consumption between the good with the highest 
rate of under-taxation of consumption-pollution, and of all other goods, including the 
numeraire good. Thus, assuming substitutability in consumption between the good 
with the highest rate of under-taxation of consumption-pollution and all other goods, 
an increase in the consumption tax on this good reduces its consumption and pollution 
distortion and raises the consumption and pollution distortion generated by all other 
goods. An analogous argument holds when the 
th i  good exhibits the highest rate of 
over-taxation of consumption-pollution, and the consumption tax on this good is 
reduced in such a way that, its rate of over-taxation of consumption-pollution does not 
fall below the level the second highest rate 
 
3.2 Reforms in production taxes 
Next we examine the welfare implications of increasing (decreasing) the 
production tax on the good which exhibits the highest rate of production-pollution 
under-taxation (over-taxation), i.e., we reduce (increase) the 
th n  production tax rate 
when( ) 0( 0), jn ss j −< >∀ . In this exercise we do not consider changes in 
consumption taxes whose non-zero levels are held constant. Whether there exist   11
consumption generated pollution and/or consumption taxes does not affect the results 
to follow.





nj n nq q j n jq q n
jn
du s R s s q R dt
≠
⎡⎤
=− + − ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ∑ .                                                  (10) 
 
The following proposition which follows directly from equation (10), 
summarizes the results of this reform program. 
 
Proposition 2:  Assume the existence of consumption-generated and production-
generated pollution, and that some goods are under-taxed while some others are 
over-taxed. 
•  Suppose the 
th n  good exhibits the highest rate of under-taxation of 
production-pollution, i.e., 0 n s >  and() 0 , jn ss j K − <∀ ∈. Then increasing the 
production tax on this good in a way that its rate of production-pollution 
under-taxation does not fall below of the second highest rate, improves 
welfare if the 
th n  good is a substitute in production to all other commodities. 
•   Suppose  the 
th n  good exhibits the highest rate of over-taxation of 
production-pollution, i.e., 0 n s <  and() 0 , jn ss j K − >∀ ∈. Then decreasing the 
production tax on this good in a way that its rate of over-taxation of 
production-pollution does not fall below of the second highest rate, improves 
welfare if the 
th n  good is a substitute in production to all other goods.     
 
In the presence of pollution, Proposition 2 identifies some key conditions for 
welfare improving reforms in production taxes which move towards uniformity the 
rates under-(over-) taxation of production-pollution. The intuition of these results can 
be as follows. When, for example, the 
th n taxed good exhibits the highest rate of 
under-taxation of pollution, it generates the most production related pollution 
distortion. Then, increasing the production tax on this good such that its rate of under-
taxation of pollution does not fall below of the second highest rate, it aims at bringing 
production generated environmental distortions towards uniformity. This result 
                                                 
17 The size of Ω is different if consumption taxes are zero compared to the case where are not. The 
results of proposition 2, however, are the same in both cases, i.e., zero or positive consumption taxes.    12
depends on the relationship in production between the good with the highest rate of 
production-pollution under-taxation, and all other goods, including the numeraire 
commodity. Thus, assuming substitutability in production between the good with the 
highest rate of pollution under-taxation and all other goods, an increase in the 
production tax on this good, reduces its production and pollution distortion and raises 
the production and pollution distortion of all other goods. An analogous argument 
holds when the 
th n  good exhibits the highest rate of over-taxation of pollution, and a 
decrease in the production tax on this good, assuming substitutability in production 
between this good and all other commodities, moves its rate of over-taxation of 
pollution closer to the second highest rate.
18  
 
3.3 Uniform changes in consumption taxes 
In this subsection we investigate the possibility of a welfare improving 
uniform increase/decrease in consumption taxes. In particular, we consider a change 
in consumption taxes by the same proportion (0 1) λ < <  of the rate of consumption-
pollution under taxation. That is, let ( )
i ii r i dE τ λβ τ = − , where  ( )0 i dτ ><  according to 
whether( ) ( )0
i ir i E β τ −> < . That is, the tax on consumption of the 
th i  polluting 
commodity is raised (lowered) according to whether pollution emissions are socially 
under (over)-taxed. For this reform, equation (3) can be written as:  
 
  Ω () () rp p r du E E E λ βτ βτ ′ =− − − >0.                                                          (11)   
 
The following proposition states the above result formally. 
 
Proposition 3: A uniform increase (decrease) in consumption taxes proportional to 
the difference between the marginal willingness to pay for pollution generated by 
consumption and the actual tax on this good, improves welfare. 
  
                                                 
18 When the pollution from the production of different goods is homogenous and pollution intensities 
are also the same, then the rate of under-taxation of pollution is the highest (i.e.,  i σ  or  i s is the 
highest) if and only if the tax rate is the lowest (i.e.,  i τ or  i t is the lowest). Similarly, the rate of over 
taxation of pollution on a good is the highest if the tax rate of this good is the highest.   13
From the discussion of equations (9)-(11) it is important to note that, in the 
present context of pollution, what is required is the reform of consumption and/or 
production taxes so that the rates of under (over-) taxation of consumption pollution, 
or of production-pollution move towards uniformity. Thus, contrary to indirect tax 
reforms considered in the literature, e.g., reforms of consumption taxes and tariffs 
(Michael et al., 1993, Hatta 1977), the present reform exercise may not have any 
bearing on whether the actual production or consumption tax rates move or diverge 
from uniformity.
 19  
 
4. Reforms under a binding revenue constraint 
In this section we consider reforms in consumption and production taxes under 
the additional restriction that government revenue cannot change because of the 
reforms. Thus, contrary to the previous section, we can no longer consider a change in 
a single consumption or production tax. In other words, we need to consider changes 
in at least two of these taxes in order to keep government revenue unchanged.   
Accordingly, we shall consider three reforms in the following three subsections: (i) 
changing one production tax and one consumption tax, (ii) changing two production 
taxes, and (iii) changing two consumption taxes. These three cases are now taken up 
in turn.  
 
4.1 Reforms in consumption and production taxes  
Equations (7) and (8) are now used to examine the welfare implications of the 
aforementioned reform programs, as well as the required adjustments in tax rates in 
order to maintain government revenue constant. To facilitate the analysis, we rewrite 
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11 0 iii nn n du p Gd q D dt δτ
−− ++= ,                                                                      (13) 
                                                 
19 It can be easily shown that, in the present context, previous results of the standard literature of tariffs 
and consumption tax reforms go through only in the unlikely case of reforming consumption taxes but 
in the presence of production generated pollution. In such an unlikely case, if, for example, the 
th i  
good is burdened with the highest (lowest) consumption tax rate, then, reducing (increasing) this tax 
rate to the level of the next highest (lowest) consumption tax rate, unambiguously improves the 
country’s welfare if the 
th i good is a substitute to all other goods in consumption (see, e.g., Michael et 
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,                                                                        (16) 
where 
1() ii i p GF δ
− ∆= Ω +  is the determinant of the left-hand-side coefficients matrix 
in (14) and it is positive assuming that the consumption tax rate i τ  is revenue 
increasing.
 20 
Equation (16) indicates that increasing the production tax rate n t reduces the 
consumption tax i τ , i.e., ( / ) 0 in dd t τ < , assuming that  n t  is a revenue increasing 
production tax.
21 Thus, in order to keep government revenue unchanged, the two taxes 
need to move in the opposite direction. 
 
                                                 
20 In equations (14) and (15) treating du and dT as endogenous and  i dτ and  n dt as exogenous, it can 
be shown that
11 (/) ( ) ii i i dT d p G F τδ
−− =Ω Ω + . Thus, (/) 0 i dT dτ >  requires that 
() ii GF δ Ω+ is positive. 
21 Similarly, it can be shown that
1 (/) ( ) ( ) nn nn dT dt q D B δ
− =ΩΩ+ . Then, (/) n dT dt is positive if 
() nn DB δ Ω+ is positive.   15
  The following proposition summarizes the conditions ensuring a welfare 
improvement due to an increase in the production tax  n t , adjusting appropriately the 
consumption tax i τ , so that government revenue is held constant. 
 
Proposition 4: Assume the existence of production and consumption generated 
pollution, some goods are under-taxed while some others are over-taxed, and that  
(i)  the 
th n  good exhibits the highest rate of under-taxation of production-
pollution, i.e., 0 n s > and  () 0 , jn ss j K − <∀ ∈, it has the lowest production 
tax, i.e.,  nj t tjK <∀ ∈ , and it  is a substitute to all other goods in 
production,  
(ii)   in absolute value the cross-price elasticity of supply of the 
th n  good with 
respect to the price of the numeraire is less than (1 ) / nn tt − , (i.e., 
0 (1 ) / nn n tt ε −< − ), 
22  
(iii)  the 
th i  commodity exhibits the highest rate of over-taxation of 
consumption-pollution, i.e.,  0 i σ < and  () 0 , ij jK σ σ − <∀ ∈, it has the 
highest consumption tax, i.e.,  ij j K τ τ >∀ ∈, and it is a substitute to all 
other goods in consumption,  
(iv)  i τ is a revenue increasing consumption  tax rate. 
Then, a small  increase in the production tax on the 
th n  good in such a way that 
it does not exceed the second lowest and the rate of under-taxation of 
production-pollution does not fall below of the second highest rate, while 
reducing the consumption tax on the 
th i  good to keep government revenue 
constant, increases social welfare.  
 
For the increase in the production tax  n t  to raise welfare the right-hand-side 
term of equation (15) must be positive. Condition (i) of Proposition 4 ensures that  n B  
is positive. Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that  n D  is positive, and condition (iii) 
ensures that  i F  is negative. Finally, since, by condition (iv), the determinant ∆ is 
                                                 
22 This condition is almost certain that holds since the 
th n good is the good with the lowest production 
tax.   16
positive,  Ω is positive by the required stability conditions, and  i F  is negative, 
then 0 i G > . Thus, ( / ) n du dt is positive.
  
Following the above analysis, consider the case where the 
th n  good exhibits the 
highest rate of over-taxation of production-pollution, and the 
th i good exhibits the 
highest rate of under-taxation of consumption-pollution. Then, conditions similar to 
(i)-(iii) of Proposition 4 and that  n t is a revenue increasing production tax, suffice to 
ensure an improvement in welfare when reducing the production tax on the 
th n  good 
and increasing the consumption tax on the 
th i good so that government revenue is held 
constant.     
Finally, by the same procedure, one can easily examine the welfare implications 
of consumption tax reforms (i.e., changes in i τ ) while appropriately adjusting the 
production tax  n t  so as to maintain constant government tax revenue. For example, 
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where  1 () nn DB δ ∆=Ω + , as shown in footnote (19), is positive assuming that  n t  is a 
revenue increasing production tax. Equations (17) indicate that under the assumptions 
of the model and conditions similar to ones previously described, a reduction of the 
consumption tax i τ , so as the highest rate of under-taxation of consumption-pollution 
of this good does not fall below of the second highest rate, and an appropriate increase 
in the lowest production tax rate  n t  improves the country’s welfare and maintain 
constant the government revenue. 
  Next, assuming the existence of production and consumption generated 
pollution we consider two special cases of the above general results. First, under the 
constraint of constant government revenue, we examine the welfare implications of 
moving the rates of under (over-) taxation of production-pollution towards uniformity 
via reforms in production taxes. Second, we examine, under the constraint of constant 
government revenue, the welfare implications of moving the rates of under (over-)   17
taxation of consumption-pollution towards uniformity via reforms in consumption 
taxes. 
 
4.2 Reforms in production taxes  
In this section, we consider changes in two production taxes, viz., for the 
th n and the 
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where  [ ]
1
2 (1 ) ii i qD B δ δ
− ∆= − +  and it is positive assuming that  i t  is a revenue 
increasing production tax. Appendix (A.1) provides the relevant algebra in deriving 
the above equations.  
The right-hand-side term of equation (18), i.e.,  [ ]
1 (1 ) nn n qD B δδ
− −+, is 
positive assuming that  n t  is revenue increasing tax.
23 Thus, equation (18) indicates 
that for tax revenue to remain constant, the increase in n t , must be accompanied by a 
reduction in the production tax  i t , assuming that both rates are revenue increasing 
taxes. Thus, ( / ) 0 in dt dt < . That is, once again changes in the two tax rates have to be 
in the opposite direction in order for the government revenue to remain unchanged. In 
equation (19), the expressions  i B  and  i D for the 
th i  good are similar to those for the 
th n good. The following proposition states the sufficient conditions for a welfare 
improving increase in n t , when  i t  is reduced so that tax revenue remains constant.  
 
Proposition 5: Assume the existence of production generated pollution, that some 
goods are under-taxed while some are over-taxed, and that 
(i)  the 
th n  good is a substitute to all other goods in production, it exhibits the 
highest rate of under-taxation of production-pollution, i.e., 0 n s > and 
                                                 
23 With changes only in production taxes alone, it can be shown that 
() [ ]
1 (/) ( 1)( 1) nn n n dT dt q D B δδ δ
− =− −+. Therefore, for (/) n dT dt to be positive, it is 
required that [ ] (1 ) nn DB δδ −+is positive.   18
() 0 , jn ss j K −< ∀ ∈ , and it has the lowest production tax, i.e., 
nj t tjK <∀ ∈ . 
(ii)  0 (1 ) / nn n tt ε −< − ,  
(iii)  the 
th i good exhibits the highest rate of over-taxation of production-
pollution, i.e., 0 n s <  and() 0 , , ji ss j K − >∀ ∈  and it is a substitute in 
production to all other goods in production 
(iv)  i t is a revenue increasing production tax rate   
 
Then, a small  increase in the production tax on the n
th good in such a way that 
the rate of under-taxation of production-pollution does not fall below of the 
second highest,  and reducing the production tax on the 
th i  good to keep 
government revenue constant, increases social welfare.  
 
For the increase in the production tax  n t  to raise welfare the right-hand-side 
term of equation (19) must be positive. Condition (i) of Proposition 5 ensures that n B  
is positive, conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that  n D is positive, and condition (iii) ensures 
that i B  is negative. Since the determinant  2 ∆  is positive by condition (iv),  δ  is 
positive by assumption, and  0 i B < , then  i D is positive. Therefore, ( ) 0 n du dt > .  
 
4.3 Reforms in consumption taxes  
In this subsection, we consider changes in two consumption taxes and the 
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.                                                                        (21) 
Appendix (A.2) provides the relevant algebra in deriving the above equations. 
Equation (21) indicates that an increase in the consumption tax rate n τ reduces 
the consumption tax i τ , i.e., ( / ) 0 in dd τ τ < , assuming that the 
th n consumption tax is   19
revenue increasing.
24 That is, the two tax rates need to move in the opposite direction 
in order to keep government revenue unchanged. 
The following proposition summarizes the sufficient conditions, according to 
equation (20), ensuring a welfare improvement due to an increase in the consumption 
tax n τ , adjusting appropriately the consumption tax i τ , so that government revenue is 
held constant. 
 
Proposition 6:  Assume the existence of consumption generated pollution, that some 
goods are under-taxed while some are over-taxed, and let:  
(i)  the 
th n  good exhibit the highest rate of under-taxation of consumption-
pollution, i.e.,  0 n σ > and  () 0 , nj j K σ σ − >∀ ∈, has the lowest 
consumption tax, i.e.,  , nj jK τ τ < ∀∈ , and be a substitute to all other 
goods in consumption,  
(ii)  the elasticity of compensated demand for the 
th n  good with respect to 
changes in the price of the numeraire be less than (1 ) / nn τ τ + . 
(iii)  the 
th i  good exhibit the highest rate of over-taxation of consumption-
pollution, i.e., 0 i σ < and  () 0 , ij jK σ σ − <∀ ∈, and be a substitute to all 
other goods in consumption, and  
(iv)  i τ be a revenue increasing consumption tax rate. 
 
Then a small increase in the consumption tax on the n
th good in such a way that the 
rate of under-taxation of consumption-pollution does not fall below of the second 
highest rate while decreasing the consumption tax rate on the 
th i  good so as to keep 
government revenue constant, improves welfare. 
 
   For the increase in the consumption tax  n τ  to raise welfare the right-hand-side 
term of equation (20) must be positive. Condition (i) of Proposition 6 ensures that  n F  
is positive. Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that  n G  is positive, while condition (iii) 
ensures that  i F  is negative. Since, δ  and Ω are positive, by the required stability 
                                                 
24 Following footnote (21), it can be shown that(/ ) n dT dτ is positive if () nn GF δ Ω + is positive.   20
conditions, 
1 (( ) ) ii i p GF δ
− ∆= Ω + is positive, by condition (iv), and  i F  is negative, by 
condition (iii), then  i G  must be positive. Therefore, ( / ) 0 n du dτ > . 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Recent developments in the theory and practice of economic policy making 
acknowledge the adverse consequences of expanded economic activity on the quality 
of environment. Such environmental degradation must then be accounted for when 
evaluating the welfare and other economic effects of various economic policies. With 
this in mind, we note that the literature on tax reforms within an integrated system of 
indirect taxes (e.g., VATs, or other domestic or trade taxes) offers, thus far, a very 
limited insight on the welfare and government revenue implications of such tax 
reforms in the presence of pollution ridden economies. Thus, in this paper we revisit 
the question of reforming the structure of indirect taxes in the presence of production 
and consumption-generated pollution, and we identify sufficient conditions under 
which such tax reforms improve welfare with and without a binding government 
revenue constraint. 
  The sufficient conditions under which the various tax reforms improve welfare 
with or without constant government revenue are stated in the relevant Propositions of 
the paper. Here, instead of restating these conditions, we note some analytical features 
related to our results. First, the presence of production generated pollution does not 
alter the known results of consumption tax reforms alone. Second, regardless of a 
binding revenue constraint, the proposed welfare improving reforms of production 
taxes alone, or of consumption and production taxes combined, are those bringing 
towards uniformity the rates of under (over-) taxation of pollution. The same feature 
holds for the case of consumption generated pollution and of reforming consumption 
taxes so as to bring the rates of under (over-) taxation of pollution towards uniformity. 
For example, consider the case of reforming production taxes alone. When there is no 
binding revenue constraint, a welfare improving reform entails increasing 
(decreasing)) the production tax on the commodity exhibiting the highest rate of under 
(over-) taxation of pollution in a way such that this rate does not falls below  the 
second highest rate of under (over-) taxation of pollution. When there is a binding 
revenue constraint, such a reform is accompanied by appropriate changes in the 
production tax on another commodity so that government revenue is kept constant.   21
Third, regardless of the source of pollution, two of the critical conditions supporting 
the results are: (i) the relationship in consumption and/or production between the good 
whose tax is changed to all other commodities, and (ii) under a binding revenue 
constraint, all reformed taxes are revenue increasing.  Lastly, in the case of 
consumption generated pollution, a uniform increase (decrease) in consumption taxes 
proportional to the deviation between the marginal willingness to pay for pollution 
generated by consumption of the a good and the tax levied on it, improves welfare. 
An equivalent result can be easily shown for the case of production generated 
pollution, and of a uniform increase (decrease) in production taxes proportional to the 
deviation between the marginal willingness to pay for pollution generated by 
production of the a good and the tax levied on it. This result is closely related to a 
well known result, viz. Copeland (1994), of tax reforms in polluted small open 
economies. That is, in the presence of tariffs and abstracting from revenue 
considerations, a uniform increase (decrease) in production taxes proportional to the 

















                                                 
25 Here, the pollution distortion vector consists of the deviations between the marginal willingness to 
pay for production generated pollution of each commodity and the tax levied on it. In Copeland (1994), 
due to the presence of tariffs, the pollution distortion of a good in addition to the above deviation it 
includes a third component accounting for the effect of the tariff distortion on the cost of pollution to 
consumers.   22
APPENDIX 
A.1 Reforms in production taxes under pollution and a binding revenue 
constraint 
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where the definitions for  , , ini B BD and  n D follow those given in equations (12) and 
(13). Equations (A.2) are then used to derive equations (18) and (19) in the text. 
 
 
A.2 Reforms in consumption taxes under pollution and a binding revenue 
constraint 
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Equations (A.3) can be written in the following matrix system: 
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where the definitions for  , , ini FFG and  n G follow those given in equations (12) and 
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